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hekate/Nyx: remove Sept completely

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- remove any reference to sept and parsing of it
- completely refactor and simplify keygen
- use new Atmo tsec keygen for 7.0.0 and up
- simplify all info/tools that depend on hos keygen and bis keys
This commit is contained in:
CTCaer
2021-08-28 17:53:14 +03:00
parent e9edcfeeb0
commit f5ec4a3a37
32 changed files with 661 additions and 1722 deletions
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549
nyx/nyx_gui/hos/hos.c
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@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
#include <string.h>
#include "hos.h"
#include "sept.h"
#include "../config.h"
#include <display/di.h>
#include <gfx_utils.h>
@@ -54,7 +53,7 @@ typedef struct _tsec_keys_t
typedef struct _kb_keys_t
{
u8 master_keyseed[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u8 master_kekseed[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u8 random_data[0x70];
u8 package1_key[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
} kb_keys_t;
@@ -82,12 +81,18 @@ static const u8 cmac_keyseed[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
static const u8 master_keyseed_retail[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
{ 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x41, 0x0A, 0xC6, 0xC5, 0x90, 0x01, 0xC6, 0x1D, 0x6A, 0x26, 0x7C, 0x51, 0x3F, 0x3C };
static const u8 master_keyseed_4xx_5xx_610[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
{ 0x2D, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x5B, 0x69, 0x33, 0x42, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xDA, 0x90, 0x46, 0x66 };
// Unused in this context.
//static const u8 master_keyseed_4xx[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
// { 0x2D, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x5B, 0x69, 0x33, 0x42, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xDA, 0x90, 0x46, 0x66 };
static const u8 master_keyseed_620[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
static const u8 master_kekseed_620[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
{ 0x37, 0x4B, 0x77, 0x29, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x04, 0x30, 0x81, 0xF6, 0xE5, 0x8C, 0x6D, 0x36, 0x17, 0x9A };
//!TODO: Update on mkey changes.
static const u8 master_kekseed_t210_max[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
{ 0x84, 0x67, 0xB6, 0x7F, 0x13, 0x11, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0x58, 0x9B, 0x19, 0xAF, 0x13, 0x6C, 0x80, 0x7A }; // 12.1.0.
//!TODO: Update on mkey changes.
static const u8 master_kekseed_t210b01[][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {
{ 0x77, 0x60, 0x5A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6E, 0xF8, 0x3C, 0x3F, 0x72, 0xE2, 0x59, 0x9D, 0xAC, 0x5E, 0x56 }, // 6.0.0.
{ 0x1E, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x17, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xBE, 0x1A, 0x4A, 0xA6, 0x6F, 0xE4, 0xAE }, // 6.2.0.
@@ -101,12 +106,13 @@ static const u8 master_kekseed_t210b01[][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {
static const u8 console_keyseed[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
{ 0x4F, 0x02, 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xDC, 0x32, 0x7D, 0x41, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xF4, 0x78 };
static const u8 console_keyseed_4xx_5xx[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
static const u8 console_keyseed_4xx[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
{ 0x0C, 0x91, 0x09, 0xDB, 0x93, 0x93, 0x07, 0x81, 0x07, 0x3C, 0xC4, 0x16, 0x22, 0x7C, 0x6C, 0x28 };
const u8 package2_keyseed[SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
{ 0xFB, 0x8B, 0x6A, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x49, 0xEF, 0xD2, 0x4D, 0x85, 0x4D, 0x30, 0xA0, 0xC7 };
//!TODO: Update on mkey changes.
static const u8 mkey_vectors[KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX + 1][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {
{ 0x0C, 0xF0, 0x59, 0xAC, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x26, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0x19, 0x55, 0xE6, 0xF2, 0x67, 0x3D }, // Zeroes encrypted with mkey 00.
{ 0x29, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0x10, 0xED, 0x9D, 0x51, 0x64, 0x97, 0xFB, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0x50, 0xDD }, // Mkey 00 encrypted with mkey 01.
@@ -122,6 +128,7 @@ static const u8 mkey_vectors[KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX + 1][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {
{ 0xC1, 0x8D, 0x16, 0xBB, 0x2A, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0xD4, 0xC2, 0xC1, 0xB6, 0x40, 0x94, 0x35, 0x63, 0x98 }, // Mkey 10 encrypted with mkey 11.
};
//!TODO: Update on mkey changes.
static const u8 new_console_keyseed[KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400 + 1][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {
{ 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x1C, 0x22, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC8, 0x73, 0x56, 0x94, 0x08, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x47, 0x0F, 0x5D }, // 4.x New Device Key Source.
{ 0x6C, 0xEF, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x8B, 0xEC, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x99, 0xAB, 0x24, 0xAC, 0x4F, 0x1C, 0x8F, 0x1C }, // 5.x New Device Key Source.
@@ -134,6 +141,7 @@ static const u8 new_console_keyseed[KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSIO
{ 0xAA, 0xFD, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xC3, 0xA4, 0xEF, 0xE3, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x53, 0xB7, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xD6 }, // 12.1.0 New Device Key Source.
};
//!TODO: Update on mkey changes.
static const u8 new_console_kekseed[KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400 + 1][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] = {
{ 0x88, 0x62, 0x34, 0x6E, 0xFA, 0xF7, 0xD8, 0x3F, 0xE1, 0x30, 0x39, 0x50, 0xF0, 0xB7, 0x5D, 0x5D }, // 4.x New Device Keygen Source.
{ 0x06, 0x1E, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xC5, 0xC8, 0xE7, 0x94, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x2E }, // 5.x New Device Keygen Source.
@@ -186,7 +194,7 @@ bool hos_eks_rw_try(u8 *buf, bool write)
return false;
}
void hos_eks_get()
static void _hos_eks_get()
{
// Check if Erista based unit.
if (h_cfg.t210b01)
@@ -202,11 +210,10 @@ void hos_eks_get()
// Decrypt EKS blob.
hos_eks_mbr_t *eks = (hos_eks_mbr_t *)(mbr + 0x80);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, 0, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, DECRYPT, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Check if valid and for this unit.
if (eks->magic == HOS_EKS_MAGIC &&
(eks->lot0 == FUSE(FUSE_OPT_LOT_CODE_0) || eks->lot0 == FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY0)))
if (eks->magic == HOS_EKS_MAGIC && eks->lot0 == FUSE(FUSE_OPT_LOT_CODE_0))
{
h_cfg.eks = eks;
return;
@@ -217,133 +224,13 @@ out:
}
}
void hos_eks_save(u32 kb)
{
// Check if Erista based unit.
if (h_cfg.t210b01)
return;
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
u32 key_idx = 0;
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_810)
key_idx = 1;
bool new_eks = false;
if (!h_cfg.eks)
{
h_cfg.eks = calloc(512 , 1);
new_eks = true;
}
// If matching blob doesn't exist, create it.
bool update_eks = key_idx ? (h_cfg.eks->enabled[key_idx] < kb) : !h_cfg.eks->enabled[0];
// If old EKS version was found, update it.
update_eks |= h_cfg.eks->lot0 != FUSE(FUSE_OPT_LOT_CODE_0);
if (update_eks)
{
// Read EKS blob.
u8 *mbr = calloc(512 , 1);
if (!hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, false))
{
if (new_eks)
{
free(h_cfg.eks);
h_cfg.eks = NULL;
}
goto out;
}
// Get keys.
u8 *keys = (u8 *)calloc(0x2000, 1);
se_get_aes_keys(keys + 0x1000, keys, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Set magic and personalized info.
h_cfg.eks->magic = HOS_EKS_MAGIC;
h_cfg.eks->enabled[key_idx] = kb;
h_cfg.eks->lot0 = FUSE(FUSE_OPT_LOT_CODE_0);
// Copy new keys.
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->dkg, keys + 10 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->dkk, keys + 15 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
if (!h_cfg.aes_slots_new)
{
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].mkk, keys + 12 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].fdk, keys + 13 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
}
else // New sept slots.
{
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].mkk, keys + 13 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].fdk, keys + 12 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
}
// Encrypt EKS blob.
u8 *eks = calloc(512 , 1);
memcpy(eks, h_cfg.eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, 1, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Write EKS blob to SD.
memcpy(mbr + 0x80, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, true);
free(eks);
free(keys);
out:
free(mbr);
}
}
}
void hos_eks_clear(u32 kb)
{
// Check if Erista based unit.
if (h_cfg.t210b01)
return;
if (h_cfg.eks && kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
u32 key_idx = 0;
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_810)
key_idx = 1;
// Check if Current Master key is enabled.
if (h_cfg.eks->enabled[key_idx])
{
// Read EKS blob.
u8 *mbr = calloc(512 , 1);
if (!hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, false))
goto out;
// Disable current Master key version.
h_cfg.eks->enabled[key_idx] = 0;
// Encrypt EKS blob.
u8 *eks = calloc(512 , 1);
memcpy(eks, h_cfg.eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, 1, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Write EKS blob to SD.
memcpy(mbr + 0x80, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, true);
EMC(EMC_SCRATCH0) &= ~EMC_SEPT_RUN;
h_cfg.sept_run = false;
free(eks);
out:
free(mbr);
}
}
}
void hos_eks_bis_save()
static void _hos_eks_save(u32 kb)
{
// Check if Erista based unit.
if (h_cfg.t210b01)
return;
// EKS save. Only for 7.0.0 and up.
bool new_eks = false;
if (!h_cfg.eks)
{
@@ -352,7 +239,7 @@ void hos_eks_bis_save()
}
// If matching blob doesn't exist, create it.
if (!h_cfg.eks->enabled_bis)
if (h_cfg.eks->enabled < kb)
{
// Read EKS blob.
u8 *mbr = calloc(512 , 1);
@@ -367,73 +254,75 @@ void hos_eks_bis_save()
goto out;
}
// Get keys.
u8 *keys = (u8 *)calloc(0x2000, 1);
se_get_aes_keys(keys + 0x1000, keys, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Set magic and personalized info.
h_cfg.eks->magic = HOS_EKS_MAGIC;
h_cfg.eks->enabled_bis = 1;
h_cfg.eks->enabled = KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX;
h_cfg.eks->lot0 = FUSE(FUSE_OPT_LOT_CODE_0);
// Copy new keys.
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[0].crypt, bis_keys + (0 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[0].tweak, bis_keys + (1 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[1].crypt, bis_keys + (2 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[1].tweak, bis_keys + (3 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[2].crypt, bis_keys + (4 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[2].tweak, bis_keys + (5 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->tsec, keys + 12 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->troot, keys + 13 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(h_cfg.eks->troot_dev, keys + 11 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Encrypt EKS blob.
u8 *eks = calloc(512 , 1);
memcpy(eks, h_cfg.eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, 1, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, ENCRYPT, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Write EKS blob to SD.
memcpy(mbr + 0x80, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, true);
free(eks);
free(keys);
out:
free(mbr);
}
}
void hos_eks_bis_clear()
void hos_eks_clear(u32 kb)
{
// Check if Erista based unit.
if (h_cfg.t210b01)
return;
// Check if BIS keys are enabled.
if (h_cfg.eks && h_cfg.eks->enabled_bis)
if (h_cfg.eks && kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
// Read EKS blob.
u8 *mbr = calloc(512 , 1);
if (!hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, false))
goto out;
// Check if current Master key is enabled.
if (h_cfg.eks->enabled)
{
// Read EKS blob.
u8 *mbr = calloc(512 , 1);
if (!hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, false))
goto out;
// Disable BIS storage.
h_cfg.eks->enabled_bis = 0;
// Disable current Master key version.
h_cfg.eks->enabled = 0;
// Encrypt EKS blob.
u8 *eks = calloc(512 , 1);
memcpy(eks, h_cfg.eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, 1, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Encrypt EKS blob.
u8 *eks = calloc(512 , 1);
memcpy(eks, h_cfg.eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
se_aes_crypt_ecb(14, ENCRYPT, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t), eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
// Write EKS blob to SD.
memcpy(mbr + 0x80, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, true);
// Write EKS blob to SD.
memcpy(mbr + 0x80, eks, sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t));
hos_eks_rw_try(mbr, true);
free(eks);
free(eks);
out:
free(mbr);
free(mbr);
}
}
}
int hos_keygen_t210b01(u32 kb)
{
// Use SBK as Device key 4x unsealer and KEK for mkey in T210B01 units.
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 14, console_keyseed_4xx_5xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 14, console_keyseed_4xx);
// Derive master key.
se_aes_unwrap_key(7, 12, &master_kekseed_t210b01[kb - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600]);
@@ -448,6 +337,7 @@ int hos_keygen_t210b01(u32 kb)
int hos_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
{
u32 retries = 0;
bool use_tsec = false;
tsec_keys_t tsec_keys;
kb_t *kb_data = (kb_t *)keyblob;
@@ -457,63 +347,95 @@ int hos_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
if (h_cfg.t210b01)
return hos_keygen_t210b01(kb);
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600)
tsec_ctxt->size = 0xF00;
else if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
tsec_ctxt->size = 0x2900;
else if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
tsec_ctxt->size = 0x3000;
else
tsec_ctxt->size = 0x3300;
// Do Erista keygen.
// Prepare smmu tsec page for 6.2.0.
if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
// Use HOS EKS if it exists.
_hos_eks_get();
// Use tsec keygen for old firmware or if EKS keys do not exist for newer.
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620 || !h_cfg.eks || (h_cfg.eks && h_cfg.eks->enabled < kb))
use_tsec = true;
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600)
{
tsec_ctxt->size = 0xF00;
tsec_ctxt->type = TSEC_FW_TYPE_OLD;
}
else if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
{
tsec_ctxt->size = 0x2900;
tsec_ctxt->type = TSEC_FW_TYPE_EMU;
// Prepare smmu tsec page for 6.2.0.
u8 *tsec_paged = (u8 *)page_alloc(3);
memcpy(tsec_paged, (void *)tsec_ctxt->fw, tsec_ctxt->size);
tsec_ctxt->fw = tsec_paged;
}
else if (use_tsec) // 7.0.0+
{
/*
* 7.0.0/8.1.0 tsec fw are 0x3000/0x3300.
* Unused here because of THK.
*/
// Use custom TSEC Hovi Keygen firmware.
tsec_ctxt->fw = sd_file_read("bootloader/sys/thk.bin", NULL);
if (!tsec_ctxt->fw)
{
EPRINTF("\nFailed to load thk.bin");
return 0;
}
tsec_ctxt->size = 0x1F00;
tsec_ctxt->type = TSEC_FW_TYPE_NEW;
}
else if (h_cfg.eks)
{
// EKS found. Set TSEC keys.
se_aes_key_set(12, h_cfg.eks->tsec, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_key_set(13, h_cfg.eks->troot, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_key_set(11, h_cfg.eks->troot_dev, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
}
// Get TSEC key.
if (kb <= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
while (use_tsec && tsec_query(&tsec_keys, tsec_ctxt) < 0)
{
while (tsec_query(&tsec_keys, kb, tsec_ctxt) < 0)
{
memset(&tsec_keys, 0x00, 0x20);
retries++;
memset(&tsec_keys, 0x00, 0x20);
retries++;
// We rely on racing conditions, make sure we cover even the unluckiest cases.
if (retries > 15)
{
EPRINTF("\nFailed to get TSEC keys. Please try again.\n");
return 0;
}
// We rely on racing conditions, make sure we cover even the unluckiest cases.
if (retries > 15)
{
EPRINTF("\nFailed to get TSEC keys. Please try again.");
return 0;
}
}
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
{
// Use HOS EKS if it exists.
u32 key_idx = 0;
if (kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_810)
key_idx = 1;
if (h_cfg.eks && h_cfg.eks->enabled[key_idx] >= kb)
// For 7.0.0 and up, save EKS slot if it doesn't exist.
if (use_tsec)
{
// Set Device keygen key to slot 10.
se_aes_key_set(10, h_cfg.eks->dkg, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Set Master key to slot 12.
se_aes_key_set(12, h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].mkk, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Set FW Device key key to slot 13.
se_aes_key_set(13, h_cfg.eks->keys[key_idx].fdk, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Set Device key to slot 15.
se_aes_key_set(15, h_cfg.eks->dkk, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
_hos_eks_save(kb);
free(tsec_ctxt->fw);
}
else
h_cfg.aes_slots_new = se_key_acc_ctrl_get(12) == 0x6A;
se_aes_key_clear(8);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, !h_cfg.aes_slots_new ? 12 : 13, package2_keyseed);
// Decrypt keyblob and set keyslots.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(12, DECRYPT, tsec_keys.tmp, keyblob_keyseeds[0]);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 14, tsec_keys.tmp);
// Derive device keys.
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 15, console_keyseed_4xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 15, console_keyseed);
// Derive master kek.
se_aes_unwrap_key(7, 13, master_kekseed_t210_max);
// Derive master key.
se_aes_unwrap_key(7, 7, master_keyseed_retail);
// Package2 key.
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 7, package2_keyseed);
}
else if (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620)
{
@@ -522,16 +444,22 @@ int hos_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
// Set TSEC root key.
se_aes_key_set(13, tsec_keys.tsec_root, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Decrypt keyblob and set keyslots
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(12, 0, tsec_keys.tmp, keyblob_keyseeds[0]);
// Decrypt keyblob and set keyslots.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(12, DECRYPT, tsec_keys.tmp, keyblob_keyseeds[0]);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 14, tsec_keys.tmp);
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 15, console_keyseed_4xx_5xx);
// Derive device keys.
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 15, console_keyseed_4xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 15, console_keyseed);
// Derive master kek.
se_aes_unwrap_key(7, 13, master_kekseed_620);
// Derive master key.
se_aes_unwrap_key(7, 7, master_keyseed_retail);
// Package2 key.
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 13, master_keyseed_620);
se_aes_unwrap_key(9, 8, master_keyseed_retail);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 9, package2_keyseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 7, package2_keyseed);
}
else
{
@@ -539,15 +467,11 @@ int hos_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
se_aes_key_set(13, tsec_keys.tsec, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Derive keyblob keys from TSEC+SBK.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, 0, tsec_keys.tsec, keyblob_keyseeds[0]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, DECRYPT, tsec_keys.tsec, keyblob_keyseeds[0]);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 14, tsec_keys.tsec);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, 0, tsec_keys.tsec, keyblob_keyseeds[kb]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, DECRYPT, tsec_keys.tsec, keyblob_keyseeds[kb]);
se_aes_unwrap_key(13, 14, tsec_keys.tsec);
// Clear SBK.
if (!h_cfg.sbk_set)
se_aes_key_clear(14);
/*
// Verify keyblob CMAC.
u8 cmac[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
@@ -557,16 +481,16 @@ int hos_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
return 0;
*/
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, 0, tsec_keys.tsec, cmac_keyseed);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(13, DECRYPT, tsec_keys.tsec, cmac_keyseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(11, 13, cmac_keyseed);
// Decrypt keyblob and set keyslots.
se_aes_crypt_ctr(13, &kb_data->keys, sizeof(kb_data->keys), &kb_data->keys, sizeof(kb_data->keys), kb_data->ctr);
se_aes_crypt_ctr(13, &kb_data->keys, sizeof(kb_keys_t), &kb_data->keys, sizeof(kb_keys_t), kb_data->ctr);
se_aes_key_set(11, kb_data->keys.package1_key, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_key_set(12, kb_data->keys.master_keyseed, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_key_set(13, kb_data->keys.master_keyseed, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_key_set(12, kb_data->keys.master_kekseed, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_key_set(13, kb_data->keys.master_kekseed, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(12, 0, tsec_keys.tsec, master_keyseed_retail);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(12, DECRYPT, tsec_keys.tsec, master_keyseed_retail);
switch (kb)
{
@@ -577,18 +501,16 @@ int hos_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
se_aes_unwrap_key(12, 12, master_keyseed_retail);
break;
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400:
se_aes_unwrap_key(13, 15, console_keyseed_4xx_5xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(13, 15, console_keyseed_4xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 15, console_keyseed);
if (!h_cfg.sbk_set) // Do not clear SBK if patched. In this context the below key is useless.
se_aes_unwrap_key(14, 12, master_keyseed_4xx_5xx_610);
//se_aes_unwrap_key(14, 12, master_keyseed_4xx); // In this context it's useless. So don't kill SBK.
se_aes_unwrap_key(12, 12, master_keyseed_retail);
break;
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_500:
case KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_600:
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 15, console_keyseed_4xx_5xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(10, 15, console_keyseed_4xx);
se_aes_unwrap_key(15, 15, console_keyseed);
if (!h_cfg.sbk_set) // Do not clear SBK if patched. In this context the below key is useless.
se_aes_unwrap_key(14, 12, master_keyseed_4xx_5xx_610);
//se_aes_unwrap_key(14, 12, master_keyseed_4xx); // In this context it's useless. So don't kill SBK.
se_aes_unwrap_key(12, 12, master_keyseed_retail);
break;
}
@@ -600,32 +522,30 @@ int hos_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
return 1;
}
static void _hos_validate_sept_mkey(u32 kb)
static void _hos_validate_mkey()
{
u8 tmp_mkey[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u32 mkey_idx = sizeof(mkey_vectors) / SE_KEY_128_SIZE;
u8 mkey_slot = !h_cfg.aes_slots_new ? 12 : 13;
do
{
mkey_idx--;
se_aes_crypt_ecb(mkey_slot, 0, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, mkey_vectors[mkey_idx], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(7, DECRYPT, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, mkey_vectors[mkey_idx], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
for (u32 idx = 0; idx < mkey_idx; idx++)
{
se_aes_key_clear(2);
se_aes_key_set(2, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(2, 0, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, mkey_vectors[mkey_idx - 1 - idx], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(2, DECRYPT, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, mkey_vectors[mkey_idx - 1 - idx], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
}
if (!memcmp(tmp_mkey, "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", 8))
{
se_aes_key_clear(2);
hos_eks_save(kb);
return;
}
} while (mkey_idx - 1);
se_aes_key_clear(2);
hos_eks_clear(kb);
hos_eks_clear(KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX);
}
static void _hos_bis_print_key(u32 idx, u8 *key)
@@ -641,105 +561,90 @@ static void _hos_bis_print_key(u32 idx, u8 *key)
gfx_puts("\n");
}
int hos_bis_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
int hos_bis_keygen()
{
u32 keygen_rev = 0;
u32 console_key_slot = kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400 ? 15 : 13;
u32 console_key_slot = 15; // KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX. Only for Erista.
tsec_ctxt_t tsec_ctxt = {0};
if (!bis_keys)
bis_keys = malloc(SE_KEY_128_SIZE * 6);
if (!h_cfg.eks || !h_cfg.eks->enabled_bis)
// Run initial keygen.
hos_keygen(NULL, KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX, &tsec_ctxt);
// All Mariko use new device keygen. New keygen was introduced in 4.0.0.
// We check unconditionally in order to support downgrades.
keygen_rev = fuse_read_odm_keygen_rev();
gfx_printf("Keygen rev: %d\n", keygen_rev);
if (keygen_rev)
{
hos_keygen(keyblob, kb, tsec_ctxt);
u8 tmp_mkey[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u32 mkey_idx = sizeof(mkey_vectors) / SE_KEY_128_SIZE;
// All Mariko use new device keygen. New keygen was introduced in 4.0.0.
// We check unconditionally in order to support downgrades.
keygen_rev = fuse_read_odm_keygen_rev();
// Keygen revision uses bootloader version, which starts from 1.
keygen_rev -= (KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400 + 1);
gfx_printf("Keygen rev: %d\n", keygen_rev);
if (keygen_rev)
// Derive mkey 0.
do
{
u8 tmp_mkey[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u32 mkey_idx = sizeof(mkey_vectors) / SE_KEY_128_SIZE;
u8 mkey_slot = kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700 ? (!h_cfg.aes_slots_new ? 12 : 13) : (kb == KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_620 ? 9 : 12);
// Keygen revision uses bootloader version, which starts from 1.
keygen_rev -= (KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400 + 1);
// Use SBK as Device key 4x unsealer and KEK for mkey in T210B01 units.
if (h_cfg.t210b01)
mkey_slot = 7;
// Derive mkey 0.
do
mkey_idx--;
se_aes_crypt_ecb(7, DECRYPT, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, mkey_vectors[mkey_idx], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
for (u32 idx = 0; idx < mkey_idx; idx++)
{
mkey_idx--;
se_aes_crypt_ecb(mkey_slot, 0, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, mkey_vectors[mkey_idx], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
for (u32 idx = 0; idx < mkey_idx; idx++)
{
se_aes_key_clear(2);
se_aes_key_set(2, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(2, 0, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, mkey_vectors[mkey_idx - 1 - idx], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
}
} while (memcmp(tmp_mkey, "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", 8) != 0 && (mkey_idx - 1));
se_aes_key_clear(2);
se_aes_key_set(2, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(2, DECRYPT, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, mkey_vectors[mkey_idx - 1 - idx], SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
}
} while (memcmp(tmp_mkey, "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00", 8) != 0 && (mkey_idx - 1));
// Derive new device key.
se_aes_key_clear(1);
se_aes_unwrap_key(1, 10, new_console_keyseed[keygen_rev]); // Uses Device key 4x.
se_aes_crypt_ecb(10, 0, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, new_console_keyseed[keygen_rev], SE_KEY_128_SIZE); // Uses Device key 4x.
se_aes_unwrap_key(1, 2, new_console_kekseed[keygen_rev]); // Uses Master Key 0.
se_aes_unwrap_key(1, 1, tmp_mkey);
// Derive new device key.
se_aes_key_clear(1);
se_aes_unwrap_key(1, 10, new_console_keyseed[keygen_rev]); // Uses Device key 4x.
se_aes_crypt_ecb(10, DECRYPT, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, new_console_keyseed[keygen_rev], SE_KEY_128_SIZE); // Uses Device key 4x.
se_aes_unwrap_key(1, 2, new_console_kekseed[keygen_rev]); // Uses Master Key 0.
se_aes_unwrap_key(1, 1, tmp_mkey);
console_key_slot = 1;
}
// Generate generic kek.
se_aes_key_clear(2);
se_aes_unwrap_key(2, console_key_slot, gen_keyseed_retail);
// Clear bis keys storage.
memset(bis_keys, 0, SE_KEY_128_SIZE * 6);
// Generate BIS 0 Keys.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, 0, bis_keys + (0 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[0]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, 0, bis_keys + (1 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[1]);
// Generate generic kek.
se_aes_key_clear(2);
se_aes_unwrap_key(2, console_key_slot, gen_kekseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(2, 2, bis_kekseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(2, 2, gen_keyseed);
// Generate BIS 1 Keys.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, 0, bis_keys + (2 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[2]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, 0, bis_keys + (3 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[3]);
// Generate BIS 2/3 Keys.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, 0, bis_keys + (4 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[4]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, 0, bis_keys + (5 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[5]);
if (!h_cfg.t210b01 && kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
_hos_validate_sept_mkey(kb);
}
else
{
memcpy(bis_keys + (0 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[0].crypt, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(bis_keys + (1 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[0].tweak, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(bis_keys + (2 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[1].crypt, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(bis_keys + (3 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[1].tweak, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(bis_keys + (4 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[2].crypt, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
memcpy(bis_keys + (5 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), h_cfg.eks->bis_keys[2].tweak, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
console_key_slot = 1;
}
// Generate generic key.
se_aes_key_clear(2);
se_aes_unwrap_key(2, console_key_slot, gen_keyseed_retail);
// Clear bis keys storage.
memset(bis_keys, 0, SE_KEY_128_SIZE * 6);
// Generate BIS 0 Keys.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, DECRYPT, bis_keys + (0 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[0]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, DECRYPT, bis_keys + (1 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[1]);
// Generate generic kek.
se_aes_key_clear(2);
se_aes_unwrap_key(2, console_key_slot, gen_kekseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(2, 2, bis_kekseed);
se_aes_unwrap_key(2, 2, gen_keyseed);
// Generate BIS 1 Keys.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, DECRYPT, bis_keys + (2 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[2]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, DECRYPT, bis_keys + (3 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[3]);
// Generate BIS 2/3 Keys.
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, DECRYPT, bis_keys + (4 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[4]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(2, DECRYPT, bis_keys + (5 * SE_KEY_128_SIZE), bis_keyseed[5]);
// Validate key because KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX.
if (!h_cfg.t210b01)
_hos_validate_mkey();
// Print keys to console.
_hos_bis_print_key(0, bis_keys);
_hos_bis_print_key(1, bis_keys);
_hos_bis_print_key(2, bis_keys);
// Clear all AES keyslots.
// Clear all AES tmp and bis keyslots.
for (u32 i = 0; i < 6; i++)
se_aes_key_clear(i);
@@ -758,27 +663,7 @@ int hos_bis_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt)
void hos_bis_keys_clear()
{
// Clear all aes keyslots.
// Clear all aes bis keyslots.
for (u32 i = 0; i < 6; i++)
se_aes_key_clear(i);
// Check if Erista based unit.
if (h_cfg.t210b01)
return;
// Set SBK back.
if (!h_cfg.sbk_set)
{
u32 sbk[4] = {
FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY0),
FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY1),
FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY2),
FUSE(FUSE_PRIVATE_KEY3)
};
// Set SBK to slot 14.
se_aes_key_set(14, sbk, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Lock SBK from being read.
se_key_acc_ctrl(14, SE_KEY_TBL_DIS_KEYREAD_FLAG);
}
}

34
nyx/nyx_gui/hos/hos.h
View File

@@ -42,34 +42,20 @@
#define KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1210
#define HOS_PKG11_MAGIC 0x31314B50
#define HOS_EKS_MAGIC 0x30534B45
typedef struct _hos_eks_keys_t
{
u8 mkk[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u8 fdk[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
} hos_eks_keys_t;
typedef struct _hos_eks_bis_keys_t
{
u8 crypt[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u8 tweak[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
} hos_eks_bis_keys_t;
#define HOS_EKS_MAGIC 0x31534B45 // EKS1.
typedef struct _hos_eks_mbr_t
{
u32 magic;
u8 enabled[5];
u8 enabled_bis;
u8 rsvd[2];
u32 enabled;
u32 lot0;
u8 dkg[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u8 dkk[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
hos_eks_keys_t keys[5];
hos_eks_bis_keys_t bis_keys[3];
u32 rsvd;
u8 tsec[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u8 troot[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u8 troot_dev[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
} hos_eks_mbr_t;
static_assert(sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t) == 304, "HOS EKS size is wrong!");
static_assert(sizeof(hos_eks_mbr_t) == 64, "HOS EKS size is wrong!");
typedef struct _launch_ctxt_t
{
@@ -95,13 +81,9 @@ typedef struct _launch_ctxt_t
ini_sec_t *cfg;
} launch_ctxt_t;
void hos_eks_get();
void hos_eks_save(u32 kb);
void hos_eks_clear(u32 kb);
void hos_eks_bis_save();
void hos_eks_bis_clear();
int hos_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt);
int hos_bis_keygen(void *keyblob, u32 kb, tsec_ctxt_t *tsec_ctxt);
int hos_bis_keygen();
void hos_bis_keys_clear();
#endif

2
nyx/nyx_gui/hos/pkg1.c
View File

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int pkg1_decrypt(const pkg1_id_t *id, u8 *pkg1)
// Use BEK for T210B01.
// Additionally, skip 0x20 bytes from decryption to maintain the header.
se_aes_iv_clear(13);
se_aes_crypt_cbc(13, 0, pkg1 + 0x20, oem_hdr->size - 0x20, pkg1 + 0x20, oem_hdr->size - 0x20);
se_aes_crypt_cbc(13, DECRYPT, pkg1 + 0x20, oem_hdr->size - 0x20, pkg1 + 0x20, oem_hdr->size - 0x20);
}
// Return if header is valid.

40
nyx/nyx_gui/hos/pkg2.c
View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 naehrwert
* Copyright (c) 2018-2020 CTCaer
* Copyright (c) 2018-2021 CTCaer
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
@@ -112,8 +112,11 @@ DPRINTF(" kip1 %d:%s @ %08X (%08X)\n", i, kip1->name, (u32)kip1, ki->size);
return true;
}
static const u8 mkey_vector_8xx[][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
//!TODO: Update on mkey changes.
static const u8 mkey_vector_7xx[][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
{
// Master key 7 encrypted with 8. (7.0.0 with 8.1.0)
{ 0xEA, 0x60, 0xB3, 0xEA, 0xCE, 0x8F, 0x24, 0x46, 0x7D, 0x33, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0xBC, 0x24, 0x98, 0x29 },
// Master key 8 encrypted with 9. (8.1.0 with 9.0.0)
{ 0x4D, 0xD9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x45, 0x0D, 0xB1, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x44, 0xBB, 0xAD, 0xAF, 0x80 },
// Master key 9 encrypted with 10. (9.0.0 with 9.1.0)
@@ -125,9 +128,8 @@ static const u8 mkey_vector_8xx[][SE_KEY_128_SIZE] =
static bool _pkg2_key_unwrap_validate(pkg2_hdr_t *tmp_test, pkg2_hdr_t *hdr, u8 src_slot, u8 *mkey, const u8 *key_seed)
{
// Decrypt older encrypted mkey.
se_aes_crypt_ecb(src_slot, 0, mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, key_seed, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(src_slot, DECRYPT, mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE, key_seed, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
// Set and unwrap pkg2 key.
se_aes_key_clear(9);
se_aes_key_set(9, mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
se_aes_unwrap_key(9, 9, package2_keyseed);
@@ -142,7 +144,7 @@ pkg2_hdr_t *pkg2_decrypt(void *data, u8 kb)
{
pkg2_hdr_t mkey_test;
u8 *pdata = (u8 *)data;
u8 keyslot = 8;
u8 pkg2_keyslot = 8;
// Skip signature.
pdata += 0x100;
@@ -152,18 +154,18 @@ pkg2_hdr_t *pkg2_decrypt(void *data, u8 kb)
// Skip header.
pdata += sizeof(pkg2_hdr_t);
// Check if we need to decrypt with newer mkeys. Valid for sept for 8.1.0 and up.
// Check if we need to decrypt with newer mkeys. Valid for THK for 7.0.0 and up.
se_aes_crypt_ctr(8, &mkey_test, sizeof(pkg2_hdr_t), hdr, sizeof(pkg2_hdr_t), hdr);
if (mkey_test.magic == PKG2_MAGIC)
goto key_found;
// Decrypt older pkg2 via new mkeys.
if ((kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_810) && (kb < KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX))
if ((kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700) && (kb < KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX))
{
u8 tmp_mkey[SE_KEY_128_SIZE];
u8 decr_slot = !h_cfg.t210b01 ? (!h_cfg.aes_slots_new ? 12 : 13) : 7; // Sept mkey or T210B01 mkey.
u8 mkey_seeds_cnt = sizeof(mkey_vector_8xx) / SE_KEY_128_SIZE;
u8 decr_slot = 7; // THK mkey or T210B01 mkey.
u8 mkey_seeds_cnt = sizeof(mkey_vector_7xx) / SE_KEY_128_SIZE;
u8 mkey_seeds_idx = mkey_seeds_cnt; // Real index + 1.
u8 mkey_seeds_min_idx = mkey_seeds_cnt - (KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX - kb);
@@ -171,41 +173,36 @@ pkg2_hdr_t *pkg2_decrypt(void *data, u8 kb)
{
// Decrypt and validate mkey.
int res = _pkg2_key_unwrap_validate(&mkey_test, hdr, decr_slot,
tmp_mkey, mkey_vector_8xx[mkey_seeds_idx - 1]);
tmp_mkey, mkey_vector_7xx[mkey_seeds_idx - 1]);
if (res)
{
keyslot = 9;
pkg2_keyslot = 9;
goto key_found;
}
else
{
// Set current mkey in order to decrypt a lower mkey.
mkey_seeds_idx--;
se_aes_key_clear(9);
se_aes_key_set(9, tmp_mkey, SE_KEY_128_SIZE);
decr_slot = 9; // Temp key.
// Check if we tried last key for that pkg2 version.
// And start with a lower mkey in case sept is older.
// And start with a lower mkey in case mkey is older.
if (mkey_seeds_idx == mkey_seeds_min_idx)
{
mkey_seeds_cnt--;
mkey_seeds_idx = mkey_seeds_cnt;
decr_slot = !h_cfg.aes_slots_new ? 12 : 13; // Sept mkey.
decr_slot = 7; // THK mkey or T210B01 mkey.
}
// Out of keys. pkg2 is latest or process failed.
if (!mkey_seeds_cnt)
se_aes_key_clear(9);
}
}
}
key_found:
// Decrypt header.
se_aes_crypt_ctr(keyslot, hdr, sizeof(pkg2_hdr_t), hdr, sizeof(pkg2_hdr_t), hdr);
se_aes_crypt_ctr(pkg2_keyslot, hdr, sizeof(pkg2_hdr_t), hdr, sizeof(pkg2_hdr_t), hdr);
//gfx_hexdump((u32)hdr, hdr, 0x100);
if (hdr->magic != PKG2_MAGIC)
@@ -217,14 +214,11 @@ DPRINTF("sec %d has size %08X\n", i, hdr->sec_size[i]);
if (!hdr->sec_size[i])
continue;
se_aes_crypt_ctr(keyslot, pdata, hdr->sec_size[i], pdata, hdr->sec_size[i], &hdr->sec_ctr[i * SE_AES_IV_SIZE]);
se_aes_crypt_ctr(pkg2_keyslot, pdata, hdr->sec_size[i], pdata, hdr->sec_size[i], &hdr->sec_ctr[i * SE_AES_IV_SIZE]);
//gfx_hexdump((u32)pdata, pdata, 0x100);
pdata += hdr->sec_size[i];
}
if (keyslot != 8)
se_aes_key_clear(9);
return hdr;
}

175
nyx/nyx_gui/hos/sept.c
View File

@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019-2021 CTCaer
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
* version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
* more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include "hos.h"
#include "sept.h"
#include "../config.h"
#include <display/di.h>
#include <ianos/ianos.h>
#include <libs/fatfs/ff.h>
#include <mem/heap.h>
#include <soc/hw_init.h>
#include <soc/pmc.h>
#include <soc/t210.h>
#include "../storage/nx_emmc.h"
#include <storage/nx_sd.h>
#include <storage/sdmmc.h>
#include <utils/btn.h>
#include <utils/types.h>
#include <utils/util.h>
#include <gfx_utils.h>
#define RELOC_META_OFF 0x7C
#define PATCHED_RELOC_SZ 0x94
#define WB_RST_ADDR 0x40010ED0
#define WB_RST_SIZE 0x30
u8 warmboot_reboot[] = {
0x14, 0x00, 0x9F, 0xE5, // LDR R0, =0x7000E450
0x01, 0x10, 0xB0, 0xE3, // MOVS R1, #1
0x00, 0x10, 0x80, 0xE5, // STR R1, [R0]
0x0C, 0x00, 0x9F, 0xE5, // LDR R0, =0x7000E400
0x10, 0x10, 0xB0, 0xE3, // MOVS R1, #0x10
0x00, 0x10, 0x80, 0xE5, // STR R1, [R0]
0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEA, // LOOP
0x50, 0xE4, 0x00, 0x70, // #0x7000E450
0x00, 0xE4, 0x00, 0x70 // #0x7000E400
};
#define SEPT_PRI_ADDR 0x4003F000
#define SEPT_PK1T_ADDR 0xC0400000
#define SEPT_TCSZ_ADDR (SEPT_PK1T_ADDR - 0x4)
#define SEPT_STG1_ADDR (SEPT_PK1T_ADDR + 0x2E100)
#define SEPT_STG2_ADDR (SEPT_PK1T_ADDR + 0x60E0)
#define SEPT_PKG_SZ (0x2F100 + WB_RST_SIZE)
extern volatile boot_cfg_t *b_cfg;
extern hekate_config h_cfg;
extern volatile nyx_storage_t *nyx_str;
extern bool is_ipl_updated(void *buf);
extern void reloc_patcher(u32 payload_dst, u32 payload_src, u32 payload_size);
int reboot_to_sept(const u8 *tsec_fw, u32 kb)
{
FIL fp;
// Copy warmboot reboot code and TSEC fw.
u32 tsec_fw_size = 0x3000;
if (kb > KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_700)
tsec_fw_size = 0x3300;
memcpy((u8 *)(SEPT_PK1T_ADDR - WB_RST_SIZE), (u8 *)warmboot_reboot, sizeof(warmboot_reboot));
memcpy((void *)SEPT_PK1T_ADDR, tsec_fw, tsec_fw_size);
*(vu32 *)SEPT_TCSZ_ADDR = tsec_fw_size;
// Copy sept-primary.
if (f_open(&fp, "sept/sept-primary.bin", FA_READ))
goto error;
if (f_read(&fp, (u8 *)SEPT_STG1_ADDR, f_size(&fp), NULL))
{
f_close(&fp);
goto error;
}
f_close(&fp);
// Copy sept-secondary.
if (kb < KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_810)
{
if (f_open(&fp, "sept/sept-secondary_00.enc", FA_READ))
goto error;
}
else
{
if (f_open(&fp, "sept/sept-secondary_01.enc", FA_READ))
goto error;
}
if (f_read(&fp, (u8 *)SEPT_STG2_ADDR, f_size(&fp), NULL))
{
f_close(&fp);
goto error;
}
f_close(&fp);
b_cfg->boot_cfg |= (BOOT_CFG_AUTOBOOT_EN | BOOT_CFG_SEPT_RUN);
bool update_sept_payload = true;
if (!f_open(&fp, "sept/payload.bin", FA_READ | FA_WRITE))
{
ipl_ver_meta_t tmp_ver;
ipl_ver_meta_t heka_ver;
f_lseek(&fp, PATCHED_RELOC_SZ + sizeof(boot_cfg_t));
f_read(&fp, &tmp_ver, sizeof(ipl_ver_meta_t), NULL);
memcpy(&heka_ver, (u8 *)nyx_str->hekate + 0x118, sizeof(ipl_ver_meta_t));
if (tmp_ver.magic == heka_ver.magic)
{
if (tmp_ver.version == heka_ver.version)
{
// Save auto boot config to sept payload, if any.
boot_cfg_t *tmp_cfg = malloc(sizeof(boot_cfg_t));
memcpy(tmp_cfg, (boot_cfg_t *)b_cfg, sizeof(boot_cfg_t));
f_lseek(&fp, PATCHED_RELOC_SZ);
f_write(&fp, tmp_cfg, sizeof(boot_cfg_t), NULL);
update_sept_payload = false;
}
f_close(&fp);
}
else
{
f_close(&fp);
f_rename("sept/payload.bin", "sept/payload.bak"); // Backup foreign payload.
}
}
if (update_sept_payload)
{
volatile reloc_meta_t *reloc = (reloc_meta_t *)(nyx_str->hekate + RELOC_META_OFF);
f_mkdir("sept");
f_open(&fp, "sept/payload.bin", FA_WRITE | FA_CREATE_ALWAYS);
f_write(&fp, (u8 *)nyx_str->hekate, reloc->end - reloc->start, NULL);
f_close(&fp);
}
sd_end();
u32 pk1t_sept = SEPT_PK1T_ADDR - (ALIGN(PATCHED_RELOC_SZ, 0x10) + WB_RST_SIZE);
void (*sept)() = (void *)pk1t_sept;
reloc_patcher(WB_RST_ADDR, pk1t_sept, SEPT_PKG_SZ);
// Patch SDRAM init to perform an SVC immediately after second write.
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SCRATCH45) = 0x2E38DFFF;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SCRATCH46) = 0x6001DC28;
// Set SVC handler to jump to sept-primary in IRAM.
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SCRATCH33) = SEPT_PRI_ADDR;
PMC(APBDEV_PMC_SCRATCH40) = 0x6000F208;
hw_reinit_workaround(false, 0);
(*sept)();
error:
return 0;
}

26
nyx/nyx_gui/hos/sept.h
View File

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019-2021 CTCaer
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
* version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
* more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#ifndef _SEPT_H_
#define _SEPT_H_
#include <utils/types.h>
#define SEPT_PRI_ENTRY 0x40010340
int reboot_to_sept(const u8 *tsec_fw, u32 kb);
#endif